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INDIA’S CHALLENGE: PRESERVING 
PRIVACY RIGHTS WHILE 
IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE 
NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
ndia, with over 1.2 billion inhabitants,1 is the world’s sec-
ond most populous country2 and the world’s largest democ-
racy.3 Yet, despite its status as a country with the world’s sec-
ond-fastest growing economy4 and a fairly developed system of 
freedoms and rights,5 India has an enormous number of both 
rural and urban poor.6 The Indian government estimates that 
it has 400 million citizens living in poverty,7 a vast number of 
whom lack governmentally-recognized identities.8 
The anonymity of these citizens often begins at birth, as 
many Indians are not issued birth certificates.9 The birth re-
porting system is decentralized, and many births go unrecord-
ed.10 Although theoretically tallying across the country should 
                                                                                                             
 1. CENSUS OF INDIA, Provisional Population Totals: India Profile (2011), 
http://censusindia.gov.in/2011census/censusinfodashboard/stock/profiles/en/I
ND_India.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). 
 2. BBC NEWS: SOUTH ASIA, India Profile Overview, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12557384 (last visited Nov. 3, 
2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Lydia Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the 
Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/world/asia/02india.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=0; see also BBC NEWS: SOUTH ASIA, India Profile, supra note 2. 
 5. Part III of the Indian Constitution guarantees several fundamental 
rights to Indian citizens. It abolishes “untouchability” and titles, guarantees 
freedom of speech and religion, provides fair trial provisions which prohibit 
forcing criminal defendants to testify against themselves, and guarantees 
protections for minorities. INDIA CONST. arts. 17, 18, 19(1)(a), 20(3), 25, 29, 
and 30. 
 6. Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, su-
pra note 4; see also BBC NEWS: SOUTH ASIA, India Profile Overview, supra 
note 2. 
 7. Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, su-
pra note 4. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Arun Serrao and Sujatha B.R., Birth Registration, A Background Note, 
CMTY. DEV. FOUND., BANGALORE, (Oct. 23, 2004) at 8–9. 
 10. Id. 
I
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be consistent, in reality, birth recording rates vary widely by 
state, and are as low as 30% in some areas.11 With no national 
system that records the lives and deaths of Indian citizens,12 
many Indians need to bribe and maneuver their way through 
bureaucratic morass to obtain basic government documents.13 
Meanwhile, the rich and middle classes of India have the abil-
ity to obtain official identification from the government. Be-
cause of this discrepancy, the poor, with their limited means of 
proving their very existences, often have little access to gov-
ernment aid programs otherwise available to their wealthier 
counterparts.14 
The rudimentary systems of identification and aid that do ex-
ist in India are village-centric.15 Aid for the poor is adminis-
tered locally,16 as individuals are generally known to other lo-
cals and so are easily and informally identifiable, particularly 
in small villages.17 Villagers are thus likely to be eligible for aid 
so long as they remain in their small, impoverished towns.18 If 
they leave those towns, however, they risk losing access to that 
aid because they have no documents to identify them as eligible 
for it elsewhere.19 Migration within the country is severely cur-
tailed in this way, which in turn has a detrimental effect on the 
rural poor, and on the economy as a whole.20 
These meager identification systems have had other negative 
impacts on the nation’s economy. For example, the lack of iden-
tification impairs hundreds of millions of Indians from gaining 
access to cell phones, lines of credit, or even bank accounts.21 
                                                                                                             
 11. Id. 
 12. The problems with reporting births also apply to reporting deaths. Id. 
at 9–10. 
 13. See Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, 
supra note 4. 
 14. INT’L. FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV., Plan to Cut Global Poverty by 50% is Fail-
ing – Needs of Rural Majority Neglected, http://www.ifad.org/poverty/pr.htm 
(last visited May 9, 2012). 
 15. Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, su-
pra note 4. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.; see also INT’L. FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV., Plan to Cut Global Poverty by 
50% is Failing – Needs of Rural Majority Neglected, supra note 14 (discussing 
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Without these rudimentary tools necessary to obtain economic 
stability and financial freedom, India’s millions of poor have 
few implements with which they may climb out of poverty. 
To combat the enormous challenges facing the poor, the Indi-
an government has created a new agency, the Unique Identifi-
cation Authority of India (“UIDAI”).22 The agency is tasked 
with carrying out an unprecedentedly ambitious23 plan: to ob-
tain personal information from every Indian, and give each an 
official ID number, so that every person may obtain a personal 
bank account into which the government will directly deposit 
aid and thereby cut out the corrupt local middlemen.24 
The program is known as AADHAAR25 (“foundation” in Hin-
di).26 Its goal is to take both personal information, such as 
name and date of birth, and also biometric information, such as 
fingerprints and retina scans, to create a database of every In-
dian.27 Each citizen will be issued a twelve digit ID number.28 
Devices linked to the country’s cell-phone network will be able 
to process an individual’s fingerprint and retina information 
and his or her AADHAAR number to verify his or her identity 
within eight seconds.29 Ideally, the AADHAAR program could 
be a tremendous boon for the Indian poor, resulting in millions 
of Indians directly accessing subsidies for housing, health care, 
and food directly through deposits in bank accounts30 for the 
first time. Additionally, the ID numbers will allow them to 
                                                                                                             
the difficulties of rural poor worldwide in accessing markets and technology, 
and the resulting negative economic effects). 
 22. The Head of UIDAI is a Cabinet-level executive. See Background, 
UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION AUTH. OF INDIA, 
http://uidai.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141&Ite
mid=164 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 23. The world’s current largest biometric database, the US-Visit program 
for visas, has information for fewer than one tenth of the individuals that 
UIDAI hopes to obtain. Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to 
Reach the Poor, supra note 4. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. AADHAAR, http://www.aadhaar.nl/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 27. See Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, 
supra note 4. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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open lines of credit, obtain important technological tools like 
cell phones, and open banks accounts.31 
In a country where only 47% of Indian households have bank 
accounts (compared to 92% of American households), increased 
access to banking will be an enormous source of growth for the 
national economy.32 The Indian central bank has agreed to ac-
cept AADHAAR numbers as adequate identification to issue 
bank accounts.33 In conjunction, banks have introduced out-
posts at rural grocery shops or other small businesses with 
enough cash to handle the small deposits and withdrawals that 
will be made by the rural poor.34 The outposts will have scan-
ners to confirm identities, and in this way rural Indians will 
have access to rudimentary banking through the AADHAAR 
initiative.35 
There are concerns about the program, however, both eco-
nomic and political. Leftists, for instance, worry that direct 
subsidies to the poor will limit support for welfare programs 
over time.36 Others argue that it is costly and unnecessary, and 
that there are easier ways to fight the corruption which often 
stymies the poor in accessing aid programs.37 This Note will 
focus on one legal issue that could pervert the noble goal of this 
revolutionary program: privacy rights. India is not known for 
its strong regime of privacy law,38 and many fear that having 
one universal ID number will allow any private interactions 
with businesses, hospitals, or banks to be easily discoverable to 
perfect strangers, or to the government.39 While its highest 
                                                                                                             
 31. Id. 
 32. Vince Beiser, Massive Biometric Project Gives Millions of Indians an 
ID, WIRED (Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/08/ff_indiaid/all/1. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.   
 35. Id. 
 36. Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, su-
pra note 4. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. There is a joke in which an Indian man, Mr. Singh, calls to order a 
pizza, and gives his ID number to do so. The pizza vendor welcomes Mr. 
Singh back from his trip to Japan, because the vendor can access his travel 
records. He dissuades Mr. Singh from buying a seafood pizza and urges him 
towards a low-fat pizza option, because medical records indicate that Mr. 
Singh has high blood pressure and cholesterol. The vendor then refuses to 
accept Mr. Singh’s credit card, and forces him to pay in cash, because he can 
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court has intimated that the Indian constitution harbors a 
right to privacy,40 the country’s aggressive anti-terror efforts 
are one of many indicators that the government is not highly 
concerned with protecting the privacy of its 1.2 billion citi-
zens.41 
India must undertake to ensure that the massive data collec-
tion does not infringe on the rights of its citizens. The country 
has not proven to be particularly reliable in making sure that 
the constitutional rights guaranteed to its citizens are en-
forced.42 For instance, in the last ten years, India has seen a 
spike in deaths of people who are imprisoned or otherwise held 
in police custody, with minorities particularly hard hit by the 
failure of India to enact and protect the fundamental rights 
provided by its constitution.43 India’s human rights watchdog, 
the National Human Rights Commission (“NHRC”), has come 
under scrutiny for failing to promote a national conversation 
about human rights.44  In order to ensure that AADHAAR ac-
                                                                                                             
see that Mr. Singh has reached his credit limit and is in debt to his bank. 
When Mr. Singh finally becomes annoyed at the pizza man’s knowledge about 
his personal affairs and starts cursing, the vendor gently reminds him to 
watch his language, noting that Mr. Singh was recently convicted of using 
abusive language towards a policeman. Usha Ramanathan, A Unique Identity 
Bill, 45 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY at 11 (July 24, 2010). 
 40. See Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 S.C.C. 632, 640–46. 
Where the autobiography of a prisoner was being published in a magazine, 
apparently without the prisoner’s permission, the Supreme Court of India 
had to determine whether that was an imposition on the prisoner’s privacy. 
The court indicated that there were two sources of privacy law in India. 
There is privacy which stems from tort law, and there is also an implicit right 
to privacy in the Indian Constitution. The court noted that it had looked to 
American cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and N.Y 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) to find that the constitution had 
an implicit privacy right, although that right was not an absolute one. Where 
privacy conflicts with other fundamental rights, like freedom of the press, the 
rights must be balanced. Id. 
 41. Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, su-
pra note 4. 
 42. Seema Sengupta, India’s Human Rights Record Makes a Farce of Its 
Democracy, GUARDIAN (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/22/india-human-rights. 
 43. Id. 
 44. The United Nations was considering demoting the NHRC’s status from 
that of a participant to that of an observer. Human rights non-governmental 
organizations and individuals working in the human rights committee sub-
mitted an unflattering report on the Commission. Manoj Mitta, UN May 
734 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:2 
complishes its goals, India must pass comprehensive privacy 
legislation that provides for judicial remedies and other en-
forcement mechanisms for preventing privacy violations, so 
that what began as a project to help the poor does not become a 
tool for increasing violations of Indian citizens’ privacy. 
India should look to the personal data privacy regime of the 
European Union as a model for its own legal regime. A national 
privacy law is essential to the success of AADHAAR, and 
should contain four provisions contained in the EU laws: a pro-
hibition on collecting data about race or caste, the implementa-
tion of a role for judicial review as a specific remedy for those 
whose personal information is improperly used, mechanisms 
through which individuals can object to the use of certain per-
sonal information, and finally, rules for informing individuals 
how and why their personal information is being used. 
Part I of this Note will provide a brief overview of India’s 
government, history, and problems with corruption. It will also 
discuss the current state of privacy rights in India, and India’s 
proposed solution to the many problems facing the poor: 
AADHAAR. Part II will discuss the law of data privacy in Eu-
rope. Finally, Part III will conclude that AADHAAR is a pro-
gram with vast potential to enhance the lives of hundreds of 
millions of people, but that it must be implemented with EU-
style privacy protections to ensure that its worthwhile goals 
are not overwhelmed by the corruption and graft prevalent in 
Indian government. 
I. PRIVACY IN INDIA 
A. India’s Government, History, and Corruption 
“India is a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic 
with a parliamentary system of government” composed of 
                                                                                                             
Downgrade NHRC Status, TIMES OF INDIA (May 23, 2011), 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-
23/india/29574012_1_nhrc-chairman-national-human-rights-commission-
paris-principles. Though the NHRC was allowed to maintain its participant 
status, the U.N. faulted the Commission for, among other things, not engag-
ing with human rights workers in the country sufficiently and not having a 
credible method for handling complaints regarding human rights violations. 
Manoj Mitta, India’s Clout Ensures UN Status for NHRC, TIMES OF INDIA 
(July 20, 2011), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-07-
20/india/29793636_1_accreditation-panel-nhrc-paris-principles. 
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twenty-eight states and seven territories.45 The executive 
branch of the Indian government is headed by the prime minis-
ter, assisted by a council of ministers that composes the “Cabi-
net Ministry” (or “Cabinet”).46 The legislative branch of the 
government is the Indian Parliament (“Parliament”), which has 
two houses: Rajya Sabha, or the “Council of States,” and Lok 
Sabha, or the “House of the People.”47 The president of India, 
who is the head of state,48 is also part of the legislative arm of 
the government, and appoints a small number of the members 
of Parliament (“MPs”), the vast majority of whom are elected.49 
Parliament’s process for passing legislation is lengthy, with 
each bill proposed by a Cabinet Minister or an MP requiring 
four “readings” by Parliament, passage by both houses, and 
signature by the president to become law.50 Parliament does 
not meet often, and passes few bills, averaging around forty per 
year since 2009.51 During a recent session, the legislative body 
intended to sanction fifteen bills, but only four were passed.52 
This tepid pace is exacerbated by the fact that India’s is a co-
alition government, meaning that the MPs are members of 
many different parties, not just one or two dominant ones.53 
The coalition government operates by reaching consensus, but 
the parties often have great difficulty reaching that consen-
sus,54 making the legislative process slow and unpredictable.55 
                                                                                                             
 45. Profile, NATIONAL PORTAL OF INDIA, http://india.gov.in/india-
glance/profile (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Indian Parliament, NATIONAL PORTAL OF INDIA, http://india.gov.in/my-
government/indian-parliament (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). 
 48. Profile, NATIONAL PORTAL OF INDIA, supra note 45. 
 49. Indian Parliament, NATIONAL PORTAL OF INDIA, supra note 47. 
 50. How a Bill Becomes an Act, INDIAN PARLIAMENT, 
http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/our%20parliament/Folder04.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2013). 
 51. Niharika Mandhana and Hari Kumar, Parliament’s ‘Monsoon’ Season 
Ends in Washout, NY TIMES (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/parliaments-monsoon-session-ends-
in-washout/. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Coalition Politics: Future of Indian Political System, UPSC PORTAL 
(May 2012), http://upscportal.com/civilservices/article/coalition-politics-
future-of-indian-political-system. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Subhajit Basu, Policy-Making, Technology, and Privacy in India, 6 
INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 65, 78. 
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Judicial review over the legislative process is very active, which 
is another factor slowing the pace of legislation and making the 
process less predictable.56 
This sometimes unwieldy system of government came into 
being on January 26, 1950, when the Constitution of India 
came into force.57 At the time, the nation had only recently 
gained its independence from British colonial rule in 1947,58 
partly as a result of an anti-British civil disobedience campaign 
started by Mahatma Gandhi in the early 1920s.59 The country’s 
history as a colonized and subordinated state makes it general-
ly dubious of broad regulatory power.60 
Furthermore, India is a country with a history of religious 
strife and the subjugation of persons of “inferior” castes.61 The 
government has outlawed discrimination based on the ancient 
Hindu caste system, which designated each person to a perma-
nent role in the social hierarchy, but it still influences Indian 
life.62 At least some of the popular resistance to the current 
government initiative to collect personal information stems 
from this history of discrimination.63 For example, Aruna Roy, 
an advocate for India’s poor, said that she found the idea of 
AADHAAR “obnoxious and frightening” because of the possibil-
ity for increased discrimination.64 
Even more than discrimination, the greatest impediment to 
the Indian poor is the nation’s culture of corruption, which has 
resulted in India being ranked as ninety-fourth out of 183 
countries in a survey of government transparency, placing it 
below South Africa and tying it with Colombia.65 Given this 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. 
 57. Constitution of India, NATIONAL PORTAL OF INDIA, 
http://india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india (last visited Jan. 28, 
2013). 
 58. Profile, NATIONAL PORTAL OF INDIA, supra note 45. 
 59. BBC NEWS: SOUTH ASIA, India Profile Timeline (Jan. 9, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12641776. 
 60. Basu, supra note 55, at 77–78. 
 61. Beiser, Massive Biometric Project Gives Millions of Indians an ID, su-
pra note 32. 
 62. BBC NEWS: SOUTH ASIA, India Profile Overview, supra note 2. 
 63. Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, su-
pra note 4. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 
available at http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/ (last visited Jan. 20, 
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culture, even if the impoverished stay in their villages, the 
rampant corruption of local officials in India results in a sub-
stantial portion of any government aid lining the pockets of lo-
cal bureaucrats and politicians instead of reaching the intend-
ed recipients.66 
The corruption in India is not limited to local officials, but 
reaches the higher echelons of national government as well. 
Recent national scandals include a “cash for votes” scheme, the 
fraudulent selling of mobile phone licenses which cost the coun-
try nearly forty billion dollars, the misappropriation of homes 
intended for war widows, and financial irregularities that beset 
the Commonwealth Games.67 Perhaps most telling, the chief of 
India’s anti-corruption watchdog was forced to step down as he 
himself faces corruption charges.68 
Anger over the severe culture of corruption has been known 
to boil over; in some instances, officials in charge of meting out 
the significant government money intended for aid are at-
tacked or even murdered.69 For example, in Uttar Pradesh, one 
of the most corrupt provinces in India, three doctors were mur-
dered, each of whom had at one point been in charge of spend-
ing the government money that was given to the province as 
part of a national government effort to improve the health of 
citizens.70 
                                                                                                             
2013). It has moved up one spot since 2011, when it ranked ninety-fifth out of 
183 countries, below Colombia, South Africa, and Liberia. 2011 Corruption 
Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, available at 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). 
 66. Many Indians took to the streets in August and September of 2011 to 
support the hunger strike of Anna Hazare, an Indian activist protesting the 
rampant corruption permeating the government. There is growing opposition 
to graft, as young Indians become more invested in the economy and con-
cerned about the human rights practices of their country. See Dipankar Gup-
ta, Waving the Flag Against Corruption, NY TIMES (Sept. 17, 2011), 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/17/waving-the-flag-against-
corruption/. 
 67. India’s Corruption Scandals, BBC NEWS SOUTH ASIA (Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12769214. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Lydia Polgreen, Health Officials at Risk as India’s Graft Thrives, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/18/world/asia/graft-poisons-uttar-pradeshs-
health-system-in-india.html?pagewanted=all. 
 70. Id. 
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Compounding the citizenry’s distrust of government is the 
perception that it is not taking the plight of the poor sufficient-
ly seriously.71 For instance, the recent declaration by the gov-
ernment that any urban citizen who spends more than thirty-
two rupees a day, the equivalent of approximately sixty-five 
American cents, is not poor has caused many Indian citizens to 
feel that the government has unrealistic views of how much 
money it takes to survive in India.72 
The slowness of enacting legislation, a historical and cultural 
resistance to broad regulatory regimes, corruption, and distrust 
of the government are all potential roadblocks for the imple-
mentation of effective and broad privacy protections for the 
AADHAAR program. 
B. Privacy Rights in India 
While the Parliament has historically displayed a reluctance 
to implement personal data privacy laws, judicial officers in 
India have been less averse to bolstering notions of privacy.73 
The Indian constitution guarantees fundamental rights,74 and 
makes the supreme court the protector of those rights.75 In the 
1964 case of Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.,76 the supreme court 
                                                                                                             
 71. See id.; see also Nikhila Gill, Delhi on 32 Rupees a Day, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/delhi-on-32-
rupees-a-day/#more-2875. Many citizens are dubious of such governmental 
declarations, especially when members of Parliament recently underwent a 
pay raise. The government has a credibility problem with those struggling to 
survive on urban streets in India. Ajit, a twenty-eight year old entrepreneur 
with a new business and finance degree, said “thirty-two rupees is not suffi-
cient for anyone, not even for a beggar. If someone’s going to buy food from a 
store then [thirty-two rupees] isn’t going to afford him much. If they’re going 
to pick from a garbage bin, then maybe.” Id. 
 72. See Nikhila Gill, Delhi on 32 Rupees a Day, supra note 71. 
 73. Basu, supra note 55, at 77. 
 74. INDIA CONST. arts. 17–35, supra note 5. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Kharak Singh v. State of UP, (1964) 1 SCR 332, 359 (India). Plaintiff 
challenged local police regulations which allowed for monitoring and surveil-
lance of him and his home as violative of his constitutional rights to freedom 
of movement and personal liberty. The court held that surveillance occurring 
via visits to his home violated Article 21 of the constitution of India. While 
the court noted that privacy was not a fundamental right laid out in the con-
stitution, it did explain that privacy is central to personal liberty, especially 
as it concerns privacy against arbitrary intrusion into one’s home by the 
state. 
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of India recognized that there is an implied right to privacy in 
Article Twenty-One of the Indian constitution.77 The supreme 
court and other courts within India have more recently ex-
panded on this notion.78 
Traditionally, the Indian conception of privacy has centered 
more on personal and domestic privacy, and less on data and 
information privacy.79 Prior to the advent of the AADHAAR 
program, India’s main concern with data protection was eco-
nomic.80 Due to its enormous outsourcing industry,81 a stagger-
ing amount of data from foreign lands streams into India.82 Un-
til recently, the only privacy protection for all of this data was 
self-regulation.83 The information technology industry formed 
its own self-regulatory body, the Data Security Council of In-
dia, operating on the idea that the industry was in the best 
place to create a regulation regime for data privacy because of 
its substantial expertise in the area.84 The enormity of the eco-
nomic interests at stake, however, compelled the government to 
get involved in the realm of data protection and data privacy 
for businesses.85 
In 2000, the Parliament passed information technology legis-
lation to assuage foreign companies’ reluctance to outsource to 
                                                                                                             
 77. Basu, supra note 55, at 79. 
 78. See Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, supra note 42. See also People’s 
Unions for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 S.C 1203 (India) (holding 
that improper wiretapping violates the  Article 21 of the Indian Constitution 
because the right to personal liberty includes the right to privacy). 
 79. See Basu, supra note 55, at 69–74; however, a national Do Not Call 
Registry has also been formed, which indicates that Indians are growing 
more interested in the notion of privacy as the right to be let alone. Latha R. 
Nair, Data Protection Efforts in India: Blind Leading the Blind, 4 INDIAN J.L. 
& TECH. 19, 24–26 (2008). 
 80. See Basu, Policy-Making, Technology, and Privacy in India, supra note 
55, at 81. 
 81. The information technology and outsourcing industries generate more 
than sixty billion dollars a year for the Indian economy. James Fontella-
Kahn, IT Outsourcing Drives India’s Economic Ascent, FIN. TIMES (July 27, 
2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/227120e2-9994-11df-a852-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1hDCXYBQ4. 
 82. Basu, supra note 55, at 81. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Nair, supra note 79, at 24. 
 85. See Basu, supra note 55, at 81. 
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India.86 The amendment requires businesses to keep up rea-
sonable security practices for sensitive data.87 The amendment 
deals only with corporate, and not state, actors.88 Though it 
leaves many holes,89 the law is at least an indication that Indi-
an regulators are taking notice of the need for protection of da-
ta. 
Just as with the data privacy laws for corporations, economic 
concerns also spurred the creation of AADHAAR,90 and those 
same concerns should cause the federal government to create 
laws which protect the personal information of Indian citi-
zens.91 The government has already enacted laws to prevent 
private actors from abusing personal information, adopting 
piecemeal regulations that are meant to protect data.92 These 
regulations allow for individuals to contract so that data trans-
actions are as secure as they wish. For example, the Indian 
Contract Act of 187293 allows for companies importing data to 
contract to ensure that high standards of data protection are 
met.94 Other rules fill niches of data privacy. For instance, 
there is an act which codifies the tradition of “maintaining con-
fidentiality in bank transactions.”95 Another act recognizes the 
privacy of those using credit lines, acknowledging that credit 
information must be collected according to privacy regula-
tions.96 
                                                                                                             
 86. The Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, INDIA CODE (2000) 
amended by The Information Technology Amendment Act, No.10 of 2009, 
INDIA CODE (2009). Basu, supra note 55, at 84. 
 87. Id; see also Basu, supra note 55, at 84. 
 88. Nair, supra note 79, at 23. 
 89. The amendment does not deal with personal data processing, or pro-
vide precautions to be taken while collecting data, etc. Id. 
 90. AADHAAR is an important part of India’s quest to include its hun-
dreds of millions of poor in its economy. Beiser, Massive Biometric Project 
Gives Millions of Indians an ID, supra note 32. 
 91. See R. Ramakumar, Opinion, Aadhaar: Time to Disown the Idea, 
THEHINDU.COM (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2698907.ece. 
 92. See Basu, supra note 55, at 82. 
 93. The Indian Contract Act, No. 9 of 1872, INDIA CODE (amended 1972). 
 94. Basu, supra note 55, at 82. 
 95. The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 
No. 51 of 1993, INDIA CODE (1993); see Basu, supra note 55, at 82. 
 96. The Credit Information Companies Regulation Act, No. 30 of 2005, 
INDIA CODE (2005); see Basu, supra note 55, at 82. 
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Piecemeal as they are, these Indian data privacy laws reflect 
the Indian reluctance to enact broad regulations.97  While the 
laws do reflect India’s recognition of the need to protect per-
sonal data in some situations, the Indian laws are less compre-
hensive than those of the European Union.98 Some would argue 
that Indian notions of privacy are very different from Western 
ones,99 and therefore that sweeping, Western-style privacy laws 
are ill-suited to fit the needs of India.100 However, in an under-
taking as vast as AADHAAR,101 privacy concerns cannot rely 
on a patchwork of rules that is a mix of “constitutional, cus-
tomary, and common law rights scattered across various legal 
fields.”102 Instead, India should take its cues from those West-
ern laws that have addressed data privacy more comprehen-
sively, so that it can ensure the success and credibility of the 
AADHAAR program.103 
C. AADHAAR 
The AADHAAR program, by using biometric information, 
hopes to weed out the corruption, fraud, and graft that domi-
nate the Indian welfare system.104 Under the program, a fin-
gerprint or retina scan will be necessary for identification pur-
poses.105 Lawmakers hope that, by requiring not just a physical 
card but also matching biometric information, fraud will de-
                                                                                                             
 97. See Basu, supra note 55, at 77–78. 
 98. Id. at 82. 
 99. Id. at 69–74. 
 100. Id. at 86–88. 
 101. Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, su-
pra note 4. 
 102. Basu, supra note 55, at 77. 
 103. Ramakumar, Opinion, Aadhaar: Time to Disown the Idea, supra note 
91 (noting that the Parliament will not pass an establishing bill unless a na-
tional data privacy law is passed). The laws need to be easy to navigate, and 
largely devoid of loopholes. Id. 
 104. Baba Umar, The Trouble with Big Brother’s Eye, TEHELKA MAG. (May 
21, 2011), http://www.tehelka.com/story_main49.asp?filename=Ne210511TR 
OUBLE.asp. Even in the United States, some public assistance is lost to 
fraud when criminals steal or fraudulently obtain a number of different iden-
tification cards. See generally James A Killerlane III, Note, Finger Imaging: A 
21st Century Solution to Welfare Fraud at Our Fingertips, 22 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1327, 1327 (1995). Killerlane argues that implementing biometric infor-
mation will easily identify those in need and keep criminals from defrauding 
the system, resulting in greater efficiency overall. Id. 
 105. Umar, The Trouble with Big Brother’s Eye, supra note 104. 
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crease106 and aid programs will be able to be administered to 
the poor more efficiently.107 The program is federally adminis-
tered and, in fact, the head of UIDAI is a member of the Cabi-
net.108 By placing the administration of AADHAAR at the high-
est level of executive government, the government has ensured 
that the public and the press will keep a watchful eye on the 
program, subjecting it to close scrutiny.109 
Making the program a “poster child” for good governance 
could instill confidence, but it is a risky move for the govern-
ment.110 On the one hand, enacting the program shows the pub-
lic that the government is making a serious attempt to combat 
corruption within India, and especially that corruption which 
most hurts the poor. On the other hand, should the program 
fail by becoming corrupt itself or by failing to protect the priva-
cy of the Indian public, it will only add to the notion that the 
Indian government cannot function efficiently and fairly. The 
stakes for the UIDAI system are high, and therefore, the priva-
cy regulations that India enacts for the program should be 
strong enough to reflect its importance.111 
Enrolling in AADHAAR is voluntary.112 It might be difficult 
to persuade poor Indian citizens to have their irises scanned, as 
millions of them have never even seen a computer.113 However, 
it is important for them to enroll, because as the AADHAAR 
system is increasingly utilized, it would be increasingly diffi-
cult for citizens to function without having an ID number.114 
Therefore, the government needs to create the right incentives 
                                                                                                             
 106. See generally Killerlane III, Finger Imaging: A 21st Century Solution to 
Welfare Fraud at Our Fingertips, supra note 104. 
 107. For example, one Indian woman, Kiran, and her three children were 
scanned and received ID numbers. She said she planned to first use the 
AADHAAR number to obtain a city card that would authorize her to receive 
subsidized groceries. “I’ve tried very hard to get one before, but they wouldn’t 
give it to me because I couldn’t prove I live in Delhi” she said. Beiser, Massive 
Biometric Project Gives Millions of Indians an ID, supra note 32. 
 108. See Background, UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION AUTH. OF INDIA, supra note 22. 
 109. Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, su-
pra note 4. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Beiser, Massive Biometric Project Gives Millions of Indians an ID, su-
pra note 32, at 5. 
 113. Id. at 1. 
 114. Id. at 5. 
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so that people will see that the benefits of the program override 
the potential negative effects.115 As noted, national legislation 
will create a greater sense that the risks associated with join-
ing the program are small, while the potential payoff, especial-
ly for the poor, is substantial. So far, however, the Parliament 
has failed to enact legislation to govern AADHAAR and thereby 
legitimize it. 
1. Enacting Legislation 
UIDAI has been operating under an executive order in In-
dia.116 The AADHAAR program it administers is thus operating 
without legislative backing.117 On September 24, 2010, the Cab-
inet approved the National Identification Authority of India 
Bill, 2010 (“Bill”) for introduction to Parliament,118 which was 
then formally introduced to that body on December 3, 2010.119 
Because one of the main arguments against UIDAI and 
AADHAAR is that both are operating in the executive branch, 
without having been sanctioned or appropriately supervised by 
the legislative branch of government,120 it is very important 
that Parliament approve the Bill. 
Unfortunately, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Finance (“SCOF”) dealt a blow to the passage of the Bill by rec-
ommending that Parliament reconsider it.121 SCOF cited sever-
                                                                                                             
 115. Id. at 1. 
 116. See Background, UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION AUTH. OF INDIA, supra note 22. 
 117. R. Ramakumar, Opinion, Aadhaar: Time to Disown the Idea, supra 
note 91. 
 118. Indian Cabinet Approves Introduction Of National Identification Au-
thority of India Bill, 2010 in Parliament, MEDIANAMA.COM (Sept. 25, 2010), 
http://www.medianama.com/2010/09/223-indian-cabinet-approves-
introduction-of-national-identification-authority-of-india-bill-2010-in-
parliament/. 
 119. Gopal Krishna, National Identification Authority of India Bill Intro-
duced in Parliament, MEDIAVIGIL.COM (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://mediavigil.blogspot.com/2010/12/national-identification-authority-
of.html. 
 120. Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, su-
pra note 4; Ramakumar, Opinion, Aadhaar: Time to Disown the Idea, supra 
note 91. 
 121. Blow to AADHAAR project as Bill is rejected, THE HINDU.COM (Dec. 8, 
2011), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2698907.ece; see also 
Standing Committee on Finance, Fifteenth Lok Sabha, Forty-Second Report 
(Dec. 2011), available at 
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/UID/uid%20report.pdf. 
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al reasons why it disapproved of the Bill, including privacy con-
cerns,122 and asked the Cabinet to bring forth alternative legis-
lation on the issue.123 Notably, SCOF took issue with the gov-
ernment for trying to implement AADHAAR without first en-
acting a national data privacy law.124 
UIDAI and AADHAAR are not doomed yet, as SCOF will still 
need to present its report to the entire Parliament.125 Addition-
ally, it is not clear that UIDAI would stop administering the 
program even if the Bill is eventually rejected by Parliament.126 
However, the SCOF report has led at least some commentators 
to call for the end of the program,127 and it has certainly not 
given more credibility to the massive undertaking. As there is 
some discussion in India that AADHAAR does not pass consti-
tutional muster without legislative sanctioning,128 and because 
the program is seen by some as a giant executive regulation 
with little oversight by democratically elected Parliament 
members,129 passage of the legislation is essential to the pro-
gram’s success. Placing control of this massive program solely 
                                                                                                             
 122. The report criticizes the executive branch of the government for start-
ing to enroll people in AADHAAR before Parliament approved the Bill. Par-
liament rejected the government’s contention that there was no legal barrier 
to the executive running the program without legislative approval. The cost 
of the program concerned SCOF, which also had national security concerns 
and concerns about the safety of the personal information of those possessing 
AADHAAR numbers. A sticking point was the program’s stated goal to regis-
ter every “resident,” not every “citizen.” Finally, SCOF questioned the general 
safety of the use of biometrics, calling it “untested, unreliable technology.” 
Ramakumar, Opinion, Aadhaar: Time to Disown the Idea, supra note 91; see 
also Standing Committee on Finance, supra note 121. 
 123. Ramakumar, Opinion, Aadhaar: Time to Disown the Idea, supra note 
91. 
 124. Blow to AADHAAR project as Bill is rejected, supra note 121. 
 125. It is not clear that Parliament will in fact reject the Bill. At least one 
member of SCOF, Rashid Alvi, submitted a note of dissent with the report, 
saying that while recommendations should be made to the government, the 
Bill should not be rejected outright. Blow to AADHAAR project as Bill is re-
jected, supra note 121. 
 126. The government can choose to overrule the SCOF report if it chooses. 
Chokkapan S., Will AADHAAR see the light of the day?, CIOL.COM (Dec. 20, 
2011), http://www.ciol.com/News/News/News-Reports/Will-Aadhaar-see-the-
light-of-the-day/158046/0/. 
 127. See generally Ramakumar, Opinion, Aadhaar: Time to Disown the 
Idea, supra note 91. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
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in the hands of a Cabinet-level office, while neglecting both the 
judiciary and the legislature, is unsavory for many Indians.130 
In order to most effectively address the concerns raised by 
the SCOF report, the government must pass a national data 
protection law which ensures the privacy of individuals whose 
information is collected by AADHAAR. The Cabinet displayed a 
troubling lack of concern about such a privacy law when it 
submitted the Bill to SCOF, opining simply that “collection of 
information without a privacy law in place does not violate the 
right to privacy of the individual.”131 Only with the appropriate 
privacy controls, however, will Parliament be likely to pass the 
Bill and allow the government to continue its mission of help-
ing India’s poor access economic channels in a manner that 
most Indians find legitimate.132 
2. Privacy Controls 
Thus far, the main privacy control on UIDAI is that the 
number of people working on its implementation has been kept 
surprisingly small for such an enormous project.133 There are 
detailed guidelines for admitting volunteers to work in UIDAI 
on the AADHAAR project.134 The guidelines include a detailed 
code of conduct, which stipulates, among other things, that 
volunteers are prohibited from revealing any information from 
or about UIDAI135 and from interacting with the media.136 
UIDAI guidelines also mandate screening of volunteers for con-
flicts of interest,137 and allow for their dismissal if their skills 
are no longer necessary to the project.138 
                                                                                                             
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Polgreen, With National Database, India Tries to Reach the Poor, su-
pra note 4; UIDAI headquarters take up “a couple of floors,” and the atmos-
phere of the office is “more like a start-up than a government ministry.”  
Beiser, Massive Biometric Project Gives Millions of Indians an ID, supra note 
32, at 1. 
 134. See UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION AUTHORITY OF INDIA (UIDAI), Guidelines 
for Recruitment of Volunteers, available at 
http://uidai.gov.in/images/FrontPageUpdates/volunteer_guidelines_2011.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2011). 
 135. Id. at 5(a)(2). 
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 137. Id. at 4(a)(2). 
 138. Id. at (6)(1). 
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These guidelines demonstrate that UIDAI is, at the least, 
paying attention to its reputation for privacy and trustworthi-
ness.139 This is prudent, as it wants to encourage as many peo-
ple as possible to take part in the voluntary program.140 Yet the 
national unrest about corruption141 makes it likely that any 
privacy concerns the program raises are likely to become con-
troversial. Therefore, privacy implementations far beyond per-
sonnel guidelines are necessary to make the program a viable 
one. 
II. EUROPEAN UNION PRIVACY LAWS 
The European Union, comprised of twenty-seven nations and 
with twenty-three official languages,142 is in some ways akin to 
                                                                                                             
 139. There are also guidelines on hiring volunteers who wish to move from 
employment in the private sector in India to work in the government, for hir-
ing individuals on sabbatical from their usual jobs, and for taking on interns 
who wish to work in the public sector. See UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION AUTHORITY 
OF INDIA, Guidelines for Recruitment of Personnel on Sabbatical/Secondment, 
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pra note 32. 
 141. See Gupta, Waving the Flag Against Corruption, supra note 66 (regard-
ing the aforementioned street protests in support of the hunger strike of An-
na Hazare). In response to the protests, the Cabinet introduced anti-graft 
legislation. However, the legislation fell short of the protesters’ demands. The 
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bill is passed. Andrew MacAskill and Bibhudatta Pradhan, Indian Cabinet’s 
Anti-Graft Bill Brings Vow of Further Protests, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-21/indian-
cabinet-s-anti-graft-bill-brings-vow-of-further-protests.html. 
 142. Countries, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm 
(last visited October 21, 2012). There are also many more minority and re-
gional languages and dialects in Europe. Press Release, European Union, 
10th European Day of Languages: What’s Happening Near You (Sept. 23, 
2011), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1065&format
=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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India. More than 300 languages or dialects are spoken in India. 
The cultures of India include “everyone from Himalayan moun-
tain villagers to Bangalorean call-center workers, from Raja-
sthani desert nomads to Mumbai street beggars.”143 Also simi-
larly to India,144 the EU’s legislative approach to data privacy 
stemmed from business considerations, not from anxiety about 
the government’s data-gathering. The European Parliament, 
with members elected by European citizens, and the Council, 
made up of representatives of the national governments of EU 
member nations, pass legislation to ensure that goods and ser-
vices move freely throughout the Union.145 The regulations and 
directives of the EU are enforced by the European Commission 
and the European Court of Justice.146 The EU’s privacy controls 
were born in response to concerns about multinational compa-
nies exchanging data across Europe without uniform regula-
tion.147 
Unlike in India, however, the European Union privacy law 
followed an omnibus approach,148 meaning that it created a 
comprehensive law which reflects the belief that data privacy is 
a fundamental human right.149 The fierce belief in, and protec-
tion of, an individual’s right to privacy is both a feature of the 
civil law tradition150 and a remnant of the horrors caused by 
the use of personal information by former domestic, despotic 
                                                                                                             
 143. Beiser, Massive Biometric Project Gives Millions of Indians an ID, su-
pra note 32. 
 144. Nair, supra note 79, at 20. 
 145. Basic Information on the European Union, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 
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 147. ILMR Editors, International Data Privacy Laws and the Protectors of 
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tries have explicitly included it in their constitutions. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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regimes of EU member states.151 While in the early 1980s there 
was indifference to data privacy on the parts on many EU na-
tions, by the later years of the decade disputes among nations 
regarding data privacy were on the rise.152 France in particular 
blocked the transfer of personal data to Italy and Belgium due 
to their lax data privacy laws.153 Faced with these disputes be-
tween member nations, the EU gave increased power to privacy 
regulators and harmonized privacy protection within Europe154 
by enacting a directive on privacy (the “EU Directive”).155 
Establishing a body of privacy regulators and imposing strin-
gent set of primary regulations, the EU Directive is a strong 
law for data privacy protection.156 This greater power meant 
that the privacy regulators could control market access and re-
strict access to EU markets to companies that had adequate 
privacy protection.157 The EU Directive also imposed three se-
rious requirements on EU members.158 First, each country 
must enact legislation for both the public and private sectors.159 
Second, each must create a government agency responsible for 
enforcing the directive.160 Third, each country must ensure that 
non-member countries with which it does business have data 
                                                                                                             
 151. Most notably Germany’s. Id. 
 152. ILMR Editors, International Data Privacy Laws and the Protectors of 
Privacy, supra note 147. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 178. 
 155. Directive 1995/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (EC) (“EU Di-
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 156. See Gaut and George, supra note 147. 
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tional Data Privacy Laws and the Protectors of Privacy, supra note 147, at 
178. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id; Directive 1995/46, supra note 156, at art. 4(1). 
 160. ILMR Editors, International Data Privacy Laws and the Protectors of 
Privacy, supra note 147 at 178; Directive 1995/46, supra note 156, at art. 28. 
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protection laws that are up to EU standards.161 Because it is 
such a huge market, the EU is able to exert its data privacy 
rules on extraterritorial countries who depend on access to the 
European market.162 
The EU’s data privacy concerns have spread beyond the 
business context into the realm of collection and retention of 
information by governments.163 As one of the strongest data 
privacy laws in the world,164 the EU Directive contains strict 
rules for data collection by governments,165 laying out specific 
prerequisites for making any personal data collection legiti-
mate.166 For instance, personal data may only be processed if 
the person from whom it being taken unambiguously con-
sents.167 No data regarding racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, union membership, 
or a subject’s health and sex life may be processed.168 While 
terrorist attacks in Spain and the United Kingdom loosened 
this tight regulatory scheme somewhat in 2005,169 the EU was 
                                                                                                             
 161. ILMR Editors, supra note 149; Directive 1995/46, supra note 156, at 
art. 29. 
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 164. Basu, Policy-Making, Technology, and Privacy in India, supra note 55, 
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 165. See Directive 1995/46, supra note 1568, at rec. 7 (noting the economic 
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an ID, supra note 32. 
 169. ILMR Editors, International Data Privacy Laws and the Protectors of 
Privacy, supra note 147, at 184–85. The changes made in the law in response 
to terrorist attacks in the United States, Spain, and England were not as 
drastic as those enacted in the United States. However, the fact that the law 
was changed at all demonstrates that privacy and data protection are, even 
in the EU, balanced against other concerns, such as national security. Id. at 
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still able to maintain strict control on governments’ ability to 
maintain data privacy, limiting the use of retained data to is-
sues “directly related to international criminality.”170 
The EU Directive allows individuals to exercise control over 
their personal information. Importantly, the Directive calls for 
the availability of remedies to those whose information has 
been improperly taken or used.171 Each member state is re-
quired to provide a judicial remedy for those whose privacy 
rights, as guaranteed by the national data privacy laws, have 
been breached.172 People who have been damaged as a result of 
improper data collection are entitled to receive compensation 
from those who control the collected data.173 Additionally, each 
member country is obligated to impose sanctions on those who 
infringe on privacy rights in violation of the EU Directive.174 
Further, the EU Directive requires that collectors of personal 
information communicate with the subjects from whom they 
collect personal data,175 and mandates that those subjects have 
access to it176 and object to its use.177 The data collector must 
identify himself to the subject, tell the subject who will see the 
data, and inform the subject of how his personal information 
will be used.178 Furthermore, an EU citizen must be able to ob-
tain responses to questions about whether and how such per-
sonal information is being used, and must be able to do so 
quickly and cheaply.179 Finally, data subjects must be able to 
object to the use of their personal information for direct mar-
keting purposes,180 and to object, for compelling reasons, to the 
use of information for other purposes.181 
                                                                                                             
 170. Id. at 184. 
 171. Directive 1995/46, supra note 156, arts. 22–24. 
 172. These judicial remedies are without prejudice to administrative reme-
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These are just some of the ways in which the EU Directive 
provides protection of personal information from private and 
public actors alike.182 The strong protections in the EU are sub-
stantially influenced both by cultural notions of privacy and by 
notions of the government’s role in protecting it.183 
The European culture is obviously quite different from that of 
India, and for this reason it is unlikely that a wholesale adop-
tion of the rules of the EU Directive would be feasible or effec-
tive in India.184 However, India should look to some of the pro-
visions of the EU Directive, highlighted here, as it attempts to 
create a national privacy law that will make AADHAAR sus-
tainable. 
III. ANALYSIS 
AADHAAR could be a breakthrough for the nameless poor of 
India, giving identities to those who are all but invisible and 
granting access to credit markets, bank accounts, government 
aid, cell phones, and other benefits that were previously out of 
reach.185 However, if strict privacy controls and regulations are 
not enacted the system could become yet another of India’s no-
toriously corrupt government projects, helping only already-
corrupt government officials. The anti-corruption movement186 
in India may be the harbinger of a future with less corruption 
and less stolen funding, but even as the government enacts an 
anti-graft bill187 it is clear that that day has not yet come.188 
While it endeavors to create a potentially stronger anti-graft 
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and anti-corruption culture, India requires strong privacy pro-
tections for AADHAAR. 
The recent SCOF report, discussed in Part I.C.1, demon-
strates the importance of a national privacy law for the long-
term prospects of AADHAAR.189 While the report lists several 
privacy concerns, SCOF cited two complaints of specific im-
portance: first, that the data collected by AADHAAR would not 
be sufficiently safe for national security purposes, and second, 
that there is no preexisting national data privacy law to protect 
Indian individuals from government misuse.190 A data privacy 
law could address security of information for national security 
purposes and also for personal privacy purposes,191 thus ad-
dressing both major concerns and potentially preventing the 
parliament’s disavowal of AADHAAR. A data privacy bill mod-
eled on the EU Directive could encourage free business practic-
es192 while maintaining the privacy of individuals. 
India’s general reluctance to implement sweeping data priva-
cy laws,193 and its piecemeal privacy legislation,194 reflects dif-
ferences between Indian and Western notions of privacy.195 
Conceptions of privacy in India relate more to personal privacy 
and modesty196 than to the notions of inherent rights that in-
form European ideas of “owning” or being entitled to personal 
information.197 The Indian people are not as concerned as their 
European counterparts with privacy as it relates to their per-
sonal data198 and therefore there is less political pressure in-
forming national privacy laws in India than in Western coun-
tries.199 Moreover, India’s move in the early 1990s from a high-
ly regulated, state-run economy to one driven more by the pri-
                                                                                                             
 189. See Ramakumar, Opinion, Aadhaar: Time to Disown the Idea, supra 
note 91. 
 190. Id. 
 191. As the EU Directive does. See Directive 1995/46, supra note 156. 
 192. As AADHAAR aims to do. See Beiser, Massive Biometric Project Gives 
Millions of Indians an ID, supra note 32. 
 193. Basu, supra note 55, at 77. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 69–74. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See Gaut and George, supra note 147. 
 198. Basu, supra note 55, at 69–74. 
 199. Id. The political pressures may be changing, as evidenced by both the 
anti-corruption movement and the introduction of the anti-graft bill, as well 
as the SCOF report’s criticism of the lack of a data privacy law. 
2013] INDIA'S CHALLENGE: NAT'L ID SYSTEM 753 
vate sector has made the Indian people even more skeptical of 
far-reaching regulatory regimes.200 
Whatever the difficulties facing the implementation of legis-
lative protection for the personal information collected by 
AADHAAR, the passage of such legislation remains essential. 
The consequences of inadequate privacy protections could be 
devastating for constitutional and human rights in India.201 
Even if many Indians do not feel strongly about their right to 
safe personal data, unprotected personal information can 
smooth the road for the government to track and monitor peo-
ple, resulting in the sorts of privacy invasions unpalatable to 
most Indians.202 
Opponents of AADHAAR are concerned that the ID cards will 
make it easier for discrimination to occur.203 Although 
AADHAAR has a rule against collecting information about race 
and caste, local governments are allowed to ask questions 
about these personal traits and link such information to the 
AADHAAR number,204 creating serious concerns for human 
rights activists.205 While the negative feelings about regulatory 
action may be strong,206 the need for strong protection of per-
sonal information is at its greatest when a government imple-
ments a program as unique, and as massive, as AADHAAR. 
The erosion of civil liberties is a concern for many of those in 
opposition to UIDAI and AADHAAR.207 One opponent notes 
that national ID cards or ID numbers have only been adopted 
in a small number of countries worldwide, largely because of 
the fears that the numbers will be misused.208 Even in the 
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United States, where the use of Social Security numbers is well 
established, the use of national ID cards raises constitutional 
concerns.209 The fear of “functionality creep,”210 which occurs 
when an ID card or number is used for purposes other than for 
which it was intended, especially for purposes of profiling along 
lines of race, drives some of the skepticism behind the UIDAU 
project.211 Opponents have also noted the absence of meaning-
ful discussion of possible privacy and human rights violations 
in UIDAI documents detailing the project.212 The system was 
introduced with an eye toward making access available to pri-
vate enterprises, toward the creation of “pay-as-you-go” sys-
tems, and toward the maintenance of health records. Many are 
skeptical of a government taking private information and stor-
ing it, fearing the potential involvement of private organiza-
tions in its use of the information.213 The promises to respect 
privacy so far have been rudimentary,214 and are not likely to 
reassure citizens who are fearful that the program will be used 
improperly. 
Another source of opposition to the project is its reliance on 
technology.215 The collection of biometric information has been 
particularly troubling to some who feel that there is too much 
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faith placed in a biometric system that could malfunction and 
misidentify individuals, or confuse their identities.216 Addition-
ally, the fact that fingerprints can change over time, particular-
ly for people who engage in manual labor for a living, like many 
of the rural Indians who will benefit from UIDAI, can make 
fingerprint data accuracy more of a concern.217 It is also worth 
noting that China recently dropped its own plans to issue ID 
cards and take biometric information from its citizens after de-
termining that the technology was likely to result in too many 
misidentifications when faced with a population as large as 
China’s218—a concern that should be equally important in India 
given its own large population. And because national ID cards 
are often proposed with the goal of maintaining national secu-
rity, they are seen as inherently tied to surveillance and polic-
ing.219 
There is also concern that UIDAI will be able to form “bridg-
es” between different groups that already hold information 
about an individual.220 This is termed “convergence.”221 The 
fear is that the collection of one’s number by different busi-
nesses or government programs will result in each of those en-
tities having information about that individual’s unrelated ac-
tivities in which he has used the ID number. For instance, if a 
person provided their identification number to a hospital and 
then was later required to provide their identification number 
to a prospective employer, convergence would occur if both the 
potential employer was then able to view the person’s private 
hospital information and the hospital could access their profes-
sional information. In this way, compartmentalization of per-
sonal information disappears, and every entity using the ID 
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number has access to a wealth of an individual’s personal da-
ta.222 
Given these legitimate fears, the Indian government should 
take serious action to make sure that the immense good the 
project can work is not undone by popular unrest regarding the 
administration of the program. It should also do so to ease the 
privacy concerns of those who work in the human rights field, 
and those observers who find the very notion of a national 
identification card suspect. Paramount among possible actions 
is to enact a national law and enforcement regime to give an 
air of seriousness to the lip service that has thus far been paid 
to privacy. 
In taking cues from the EU Directive, the Indian government 
should include in its national privacy law a prohibition on the 
collection of information regarding race or caste.223 Information 
about caste or race will not serve the core purposes of the 
AADHAAR program, as it will not help to identify individuals 
any more certainly than the biometric information already 
will.224 Importantly, information about race or caste is not rele-
vant to accessing bank accounts, subsidized groceries, or the 
many other programs that AADHAAR hopes to facilitate. If In-
dia is to take seriously its abolishment of the caste system225 
and its commitment to include the poor in its economy,226 col-
lecting information about caste as part of information linked to 
an individual’s ID card has no place. The current rules allowing 
local officials to ask AADHAAR ID recipients about race or 
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caste should be tightened as part of the privacy law, and only 
allowed insofar as absolutely necessary to accomplish 
AADHAAR’s goals, if at all. 
Next, the privacy law should, like the EU Directive, explicitly 
include provisions for judicial review of citizen complaints.227 
The judiciary would serve as a sort of third party “enforcer” to 
ensure that the government administrators of AADHAAR are 
accountable to those people whom it is meant to protect. Like a 
European citizen,228 an Indian who felt he had been damaged 
by AADHAAR’s improper use of his personal information could 
bring a claim for damages. The threat of lawsuits resulting 
from improper use of personal data would incentivize UIDAI to 
take care that it used the collected information only for its in-
tended purposes. Because there is already a very active judicial 
review process in India,229 this type of regulation is one that 
fits the Indian regulatory culture230 and would likely garner 
support. 
When Indians go to sign up for AADHAAR, they should be 
told exactly the intended purpose and usage of their personal 
information. A national data privacy law must mandate that 
the government clearly explain to individuals (1) who will have 
access to the information, (2) the intended use of that infor-
mation, and (3) what rights of access to that information they 
maintain.231 Doing so will alleviate confusion and make it clear 
to ID recipients both exactly how AADHAAR will help them 
and exactly who is able to access their information in order to 
help them.232 Such a provision will instill confidence in recipi-
ents and encourage them to use their IDs to maximize their 
benefits, confident that their information will not be used in 
ways that will harm them. 
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Finally, the Indian privacy law must also include mecha-
nisms by which individuals can object to the uses being made of 
their personal information.233 Citizens with legitimate, compel-
ling reasons should be able to quickly indicate that they do not 
agree with their information being disseminated for certain 
purposes.234 This provision would tie in with the provision 
mandating disclosure to recipients of the intended use of their 
information, because when the use of the data exceeds that dis-
closed scope, a citizen will have a cause for complaint. This 
provision will further serve as a check on AADHAAR’s ability 
to misappropriate personal information, because the ability to 
object will create administrative costs for UIDAI and create 
political pressures to ensure that personal data is being used 
only for the purposes intended. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to live up to its title of the world’s largest democracy, 
India must value the dignity and identity of even the poorest of 
its 1.2 billion citizens. In creating the AADHAAR system, the 
country has shown that it takes the plight of its poor, many of 
whom live in the most hopeless circumstances, seriously. It also 
demonstrates that the highest levels of federal government are 
focused on reigning in the rampant corruption and graft harm-
ing the people of India. But in order to maintain its democratic 
ideals, India must ensure that the massive amount of infor-
mation it collects through AADHAAR is used only for the lim-
ited purposes for which it is collected. 
Federal legislative solutions are the most effective way to 
lend credence to the program. They will create national stand-
ards that will make it easier for the very disparate govern-
ments of the different states of India to administer the pro-
gram, and ensure that rural and urban, rich and poor, are 
treated alike as to how the government uses their information. 
A law passed with the Parliament’s seal of approval will create 
an air of legitimacy around a project that has thus far been 
viewed as an executive enactment with little appropriate over-
sight. 
Creating rules for data sharing, and enforcement mecha-
nisms for realizing those rules, will give average Indians a 
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sense of control and will incentivize them to take part in 
AADHAAR. National privacy laws modeled particularly on the 
EU Directive will ease one of SCOF’s major concerns: that the 
data collected through AADHAAR will not be kept private or 
properly protected. Taking such precautions will, in turn, make 
it more likely that the Parliament will approve the program, 
and therefore more likely that the hundreds of millions of Indi-
an citizens who could benefit from the program will have a 
chance to access banks, credit, and technology, and thus be bet-
ter equipped to function in the modern economy. 
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